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LINKED ARTICLES - INTELLIGENCE

This is a series of articles about the topic of intelligence. The aim of the series is to look at intelligence in different situations, including humans, non-human animals, and machines.

No.1 - NON-HUMAN ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE

If it is debatable about machines being intelligent, and what intelligence means for humans, then deciding whether non-human animals are intelligent is very difficult. Before the question can be answered, it is necessary to try and define intelligence in this area.

This article is not meant to be a comprehensive survey of the topic, but to give an overview of the issues, and really to show the problems in defining non-human animal intelligence (subsequently called "animal intelligence" for convenience). There are overlaps here with the topics of cognition and consciousness. Questions about animal intelligence are linked to whether they are conscious, and is it possible to be intelligent without being conscious?

Table 1 gives a summary of the main issues that arise when discussing animal intelligence. The article will then address each issue in turn. It may not be possible to reach a conclusion on each of them in the short space available.

1. Sense abilities beyond humans
2. Memory capacity
3. Learning including imitation, problem-solving, insight, imagining (cognitive maps), forethought and planning; use of tools
4. Number and concept-handling including symbols and language
5. Self recognition, self-awareness and self-consciousness
6. Theory of mind including understanding intention, deception, and empathy
7. Culture
8. Consciousness

Table 1 - summary of issues in animal intelligence.

1. SENSE ABILITIES BEYOND HUMANS

There are many cases where animals appear to show intelligence, but this may be due to sense abilities beyond humans. For example, pet dogs appear to know when the wrong newspaper has been delivered. They are not reading the name, but can sense the different smell of the newsprint (O'Connell 1999). This is associated learning without any insight.

The ability of animals to navigate vast distances (eg: migrating birds) is seen as highly sophisticated. Sheldrake (1999) has argued further that animals have abilities like premonition for earthquakes, for example. But both these could be automatic processes based on smell or magnetic senses rather than intelligence.

2. MEMORY CAPACITY

Intelligence is linked to memory capacity, but is it just that? For example, nightingales can reproduce their song after one hearing only. Other birds are able to recall stored food after hibernation. Nutcrackers remember the location of approximately 33 000 nuts over the winter period (O'Connell 1999).

Clayton (1998) showed in experiments how scrubjays can, not only recall the hiding places of food, but the distinction between perishables (eg worms) to be eaten first, and non-perishables (eg: nuts). The part of the brain involved with memory is found to expand during "caching" and "retrieving" time. However, a computer has a good memory, but it is not necessarily intelligent (Krebs 1995).

The size of memory is linked to brain capacity, and this capacity is also linked to intelligence. Whitten (1999) suggests that an animal's lifestyle and the demands of the environment may determine the intelligence and memory needed. These will be important in some animals and not in others. For example, sea squirts swim around and then settle on a rock. At this point they digest their own brain. The brain is an expensive organ in energy terms.

3. LEARNING

(including imitation, problem-solving, imagining, forethought and planning, use of tools)

Imitation

Primates seem to be the only animals that show evidence of imitation of each other and humans. Savage-Rumbaugh (1997) quotes the example of orang-utans imitating behaviour in captivity; eg: humans washing self and clothes with soap in local river. But this could be imitation without understanding.

Problem-solving

Problem-solving would assume a knowledge of how the world works. Povinelli (2000) found that lab-reared

chimpanzees failed the "hook-and-post test". The chimpanzees were trained to use a stick with a hook at the end to reach a banana. But when the hook was removed from the stick, they do not realise that the stick can still be used to reach the "platform" where the banana is lying. Hauser (2000) challenges these findings with tamarin monkeys. These animals were trained to reach food with a blue cane and not a yellow one. But when the colour was changed, they were able to use the yellow cane to reach the food. The monkeys were paying attention to the relevant features.

Pearce (1999) is sceptical about animal problem-solving. There are limits to thinking in pictures (ie without language). For example, it is very difficult to express the relationships between objects without language. Also problem-solving may be evident only for problems relevant to that animal.

Insight

Insight is the ability to realise the answer to a problem without trial and error learning. Heinrich (1995) believes that this is evident with ravens attempting to get food hanging on a string from the branch of a tree (an entirely new situation for the hand-reared birds). There has to be an imagining of the steps before acting. Heyes (1995) is fairly convinced that complex learning and behaviour can occur without awareness, though.

Kohler (1925) was the first person to claim that chimpanzees could problem-solve by insight. A banana too high to reach could only be got by placing crates on top of each other and climbing up. The chimpanzees appeared defeated by the problem, and then had the insight ("Aha experience") to solve it. There is still a debate about how much trial and error was involved in these situations or whether it was genuine insight (Gould and Gould 1999).

Imagining

The storing of images or mental representations about the environment. Poppinjays, who store many seeds for the winter, have been tested experimentally for their recall abilities. Balder (1998) argues that during retrieval, it is not local landmarks, nor smell, nor retracing steps that are being used. This must leave a mental representation of the location - known as a "cognitive map".

In experimental situations, bees can find plates of sugar from different starting points. This shows a

mental representation of the spatial area (Pickard 1999). But whether they are conscious of this image is another question.

In a different situation, Kuhlmeier et al (1999) showed that "Sheba" (male chimpanzee) could find food hidden in a room after being shown where it is hidden in a model of the room. This requires the ability to extrapolate the image of the model to the real room.

Forethought and planning

The ability to plan or prepare for the future. Beck (1995) shows that gulls breaking shells by dropping them on a stonewall is evidence of planning. There has to be a spatial map of the area, and the intention to go to the wall. Likewise, crows only cache clams during low tide because clams not available during high tide. Also they only take clams over a certain size (Butler 1998). However, many animals hoard food for winter without any understanding of why.

Use of tools

"Tool use" has traditionally been seen as a distinction between humans and chimpanzees. It is the creative use of objects which must be a sign of intelligence. Jane Goodall first challenged this distinction in the 1960s from observations in East Africa. She noticed that chimpanzees would strip branches of leaves and put them in termite hills to get food (ie: the termites climb on the branches).

Gould and Gould (1999) challenge this example:

Photographs frequently show a younger chimpanzees appearing to study the behaviour before trying it. But observations of lab-born chimps reveal that chimpanzees in general are obsessed with putting long, thin objects into holes - pencils into electrical outlets, for instance (p55).

4. NUMBER AND CONCEPT-HANDLING (including symbols and language)

It may seem reasonable to suggest that the use of symbols, most obviously with language, is a sign of intelligence. The use of symbols allows for concepts and number-handling.

Irene Pepperberg has worked with "Alex" (African grey parrot) for a number of years. He is able to

categorise objects as bigger or smaller, for example, with 60-90% accuracy (Vines 2000b). "Alex" is able to name certain objects like wood, based upon their feel in his beak. He is also able to describe more than 100 different objects with about 80% accuracy (Pepperberg 1999). Taken further, it is claimed that "Alex" shows evidence of "object permanence" (Pepperberg et al 1997) ¹.

"Alex's" language use includes the creation of new words like "banarry" when he saw a pineapple for the first time. This was the combination of known fruit words - banana and cherry. "Alex" is different to many monkeys taught language. They are usually trained by operant conditioning ie rewarding the use of the correct symbol/sign for an object. While "Alex" learnt by watching Pepperberg train another human in this way. Technically he was taught by observational learning. Critics have suggested that the trainers may be unwittingly giving cues to the correct answer.

Brannon and Terrace (quoted in Motluk 1998), working with rhesus monkeys, have found that they can understand the sequence of numbers up to nine (with 75% accuracy on tests). There is another debate as to whether numerical skills can exist without language abilities.

In fact, there is the suggestion that macaque monkeys are better at simple maths than one-year-old human babies (O'Leary 1998). What the simple maths ability shows is that the monkeys are recognising individual objects, grouping them, and tagging them with a value which allows the monkeys to keep track. Other famous examples of counting monkeys include "Sheba" (male chimpanzee) trained by Sarah Boysen (Vine 2000a).

As to whether animals use their own form of communication as a language is open to debate. A number of species, like baboons, have various alarm calls and grunts. Monkeys on Cayo Santiago have calls to distinguish low and high quality food (Hauser 1999). But generally there is no syntax or grammar.

Teaching human language (usually sign or symbol language) to monkeys has a history of about thirty years. Twenty-two great apes have been taught in that time (O'Connell 1997). The most fluent is "Panbanisha" (bonobo chimpanzee) under the guidance of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh. The argument about the use of these languages revolves around the concepts of displacement and productivity. The former is talking about objects that are not physically present, and productivity is the creation of unique

¹ This is the ability to know an object exists even when it is not physically present. This is seen as a key step in human cognitive development, and occurs around 8-12 months old.

utterances. Apart from the strong supporters of animal language, many people would agree with Carroll (1986):

although these chimps have grasped some of the rudiments of human language, what they have learned and the speed at which they learn it... is qualitatively different from those of human beings.

5. SELF RECOGNITION, SELF-AWARENESS AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Morton (2000) defines self-consciousness as "a subjective understanding of the environment, involving private thoughts unobservable to outsiders and enabling a being to be aware of its own existence, especially in relation to others", while self-awareness is the "ability to become the object of one's own attention" (p78). Self recognition is usually assessed with the mirror test.

Animals placed in front of a mirror will react as if it is another animal unless they have self-recognition. Chimpanzees, after an initial reaction to another animal, show evidence of self-recognition. They also recognise that a red spot on the eyebrow is on them. Self-recognition in the mirror test has not been generally found in many primates, elephants, birds or dolphins²; only chimpanzees and orang-utans (Gallup 1999).

Suarez (quoted in Gallup 1999) even raised rhesus monkeys in cages with full-length mirrors, and they showed no evidence of self-recognition. Human infants pass the mirror test at around 18-24 months of age as the pre-frontal cortex begins to mature.

However, the use of a mirror is not the same as having a concept of the self (Heyes 1999). For Heyes, a knowledge of mortality, and the continuation of existence of the self before and after this moment are necessary for self-consciousness.

Yet, mammals can be said to show self-consciousness in relation to others when hiding themselves or covering their tracks. Morton (2000) is convinced that self-consciousness is part of the higher development of the cerebral cortex.

It is believed that knowledge of mental states in the self paves the way for knowledge of others.

Budiansky (quoted in McComb and Semple 1998) makes the distinction between "first order" and "second order intentionality"; and animals do not have the second. "First order intentionality" is the ability to have thoughts, while "second order" is the ability to have

² Martin (1999) argues that dolphins do show self-recognition in the mirror test.

thoughts about thoughts.

Self-recognition and self-awareness (in the sense of awareness of the body) are more straightforward than self-consciousness (which includes awareness of own mortality and existence in time). But are these phenomena signs or products of intelligence, or co-existing with it? Is it possible to be self-conscious without being intelligent or vice-versa?

6. THEORY OF MIND

(including understanding intention, deception and empathy)

One step on from self awareness is the awareness of the minds of others. Heyes (1999) notes the example of female baboons who groom the male, who has the food, and when he relaxes, she steals the food. Is this a "theory of mind" or just knowledge of behaviour? "Theory of mind" is the term for an individual being able to understand the thinking behind the behaviour of another individual.

A human puts sweets in a container in front of the monkeys, then leaves the room. "Panbanisha" (bonobo chimpanzee) watched bugs substituted for sweets by another human, and knew when the first human re-entered the room, they would expect to find sweets. This is a commonly used scenario for the "theory of mind"; ie: to take the other's perspective. This topic is discussed at length in Heyes (1998).

"Austin" "knows" that "Sherman" is afraid of the dark. The former will make noises at night to scare the latter if "Sherman" is being difficult (Vines 1992). These are chimpanzees.

Understanding intention

Povinelli (quoted in Vines 1992) arranged for two humans to deliver a drink to the chimpanzees. One of the humans accidentally spilled it, while the other deliberately poured it away in front of the chimpanzees. The chimpanzees showed a preference for the first person to deliver future drinks. This is the ability to understand intentions.

But Povinelli (1999) found that chimpanzees would gesture for food to experimenters who were blindfolded equally as those who were not blindfolded. Povinelli argues that reasoning about another's mental state is unique to humans.

Deception

Knowing what the other is thinking allows for deception. Spinney (1998) quotes examples of chimpanzees competing for rewards, who would try to indicate the wrong hiding place to competitors, while vervet monkeys cornered by others make "alarm calls" to distract the other monkeys.

Less sophisticated deception can be seen in adult birds that feign injury to lead predators away from their nests. Is this just the automatic survival tactics of animals to protect their offspring?

7. EXISTENCE OF CULTURE

Traditionally this is seen as another distinction between humans and non-humans. Even non-human primates, who are close to humans in many ways, do not have culture (or do they)? The dominance hierarchies of certain monkeys, like vervets, is quite sophisticated, but it is not the same as human culture.

Yet there is evidence of "enculturation" among apes reared by humans, particularly in language teaching studies. For example, "Kansi" (bonobo chimpanzee) was never directly taught "symbol language", but picked it up from the teaching of "Matata" (adopted mother) (Savage-Rumbaugh 1991). Similarly, "Washoe" (chimpanzee) was seen to teach her infant American Sign Language (ASL) (Gardner and Gardner 1980). But these are not typical situations.

However, studies have found animals showing social transmission of individual behaviours in their own habitats; eg: sweet potato washing in sea water by macaques at Koshima, Japan (Imanishi 1957). The social or cultural transmission of ideas across generations is used as a key concept of culture by biologists.

Only recently has more detailed evidence of cultural transmission been highlighted among chimpanzees. Whiten et al (1999) summarise field studies with chimpanzees which reveal behavioural differences in the seven communities studied. The patterns are "highly distinctive" in each community, and thus not common species-specific behaviour. The researchers detail 39 different behaviour patterns which show evidence of cultural transmission across generations. An example of the differences between chimpanzee communities is seen with tool use to collect ants: one group use a long stick for the ants to climb on to, which is wiped by the hand to pick up the ants and put in the mouth, while another community use a short stick that goes directly to the mouth with the ants on it.

Frans de Waal (2002) argues that these behaviours

along with "Machiavellian intelligence"³, empathy, and looking after non-genetic orphans are signs of culture.

Allsopp and Brewer (2002), talking about modelling of human cognition, point out that culture is more complex than just the intergenerational transmission of behaviours. It includes values, beliefs, customs, rules, and regulations. Culture influences all behaviour if a social constructionist or sociological position is taken.

What can be said is that the existence of culture could be a product of intelligence rather than as a means of defining intelligence by itself.

8. CONSCIOUSNESS

The traditional view of consciousness is that there is a single unitary system that humans have to make them conscious. Dennett (1995) argues that the brain is a series of systems (eg: perception; attention), and it is the collaboration of these systems in humans that makes consciousness as we know it.

Consciousness is not necessarily the same as awareness of the world. It is quite possible to have "unconscious perception"; ie: perception of aspects of the world without making overall sense of it.

Susan Greenfield (1999) has argued for consciousness as a "dimmer switch" with varying degrees of consciousness between species rather than having or not having it. The level of consciousness being linked to certain aspects of the brain's physiology (eg: "bilateral peptides" - neurotransmitters in the brain).

Consciousness is a debate in itself, but is it possible to be intelligent without being conscious? One way to look at the issue is to see different types or aspects of consciousness, and different animals have different amounts depending on their needs. For example, awareness of pain is evident in dogs, but not self-awareness compared to humans. It could be possible to create a list of the different types of consciousness and how important each one is to different animals. Likewise, there may be different types of intelligence, and different animals' needs vary. In some animals, basic intelligence exists without consciousness (ie: automatic responses), which are not very flexible, while for other animals, intelligence is linked to consciousness because flexibility is required. The latter could be seen in

³ A term for "social intelligence" - the ability to guess what others are thinking. Also seen as part of the "theory of mind". "Machiavellian intelligence" suggests the use of this knowledge to benefit the self.

primates, which are social animals, and flexibility is needed in social interactions. Many aspects of intelligence can be seen as evolved because of such requirements.

CONCLUSIONS

It is probably the wrong question to ask if animals are intelligent. Most importantly, animals evolved the abilities needed to survive in their environments. In some cases, it is limited compared to others. Intelligence, it is proposed, is made up of different separate abilities ("intelligences"), but these abilities share common strands. Only in humans do all these separate abilities produce "Intelligence" (figure 1). Which "intelligences" exist for animals depend upon the demands of their environment.




Figure 1 - Model of "Intelligence" and "intelligences".

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GENDER AND SEXUALITY - AN INTRODUCTION TO SOME OF THE ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

The traditional approach of sexology (the "scientific" study of sexuality) tended to take a biological approach to sexuality. Thus a clear "natural" heterosexual norm was the focus with anything outside that norm seen as pathological.

For Brittan (1989), to be a "real man", masculine ideology emphasises being heterosexually active, initiators of sexual relations, and having a powerful sex drive. Seidler (1989) notes how this may even involve men pretending to other men that they are sexually active with boasting etc. "Performance" and "conquest" become areas where men have to prove themselves continually (Metcalf and Humphries 1985).

Boyle (1994) summarises the messages from sexology:

- i) "men were naturally dominant and females submissive";
- ii) "in order to achieve true femininity and womanhood, women had to surrender their bodies and personalities to their husbands through enjoyment of intercourse";
- iii) "women were rather a problem sexually and that they needed men to teach them 'mature' sexual responsiveness";
- iv) "if women rejected this route to fulfilment, they would be denigrated as emotionally diseased".

Recent approaches, by feminists and social constructionists, for example, have concentrated on the sexual and cultural constructions of sexuality.

The term "sexuality" itself can be confusing. Oakley (1972) sees it as "behaviour related to copulation", but also the "whole area of personality related to sexual behaviour".

What is seen as "natural" sexual behaviour in this society - male initiation and female receptiveness - is not borne out in other cultures. For example, Mead (1935) observed very different behaviour among the Arapesh of south-east Asia:

the Arapesh further contravene our traditional idea of men as spontaneously sexual creatures, and women as innocent of desire, until wakened, by denying spontaneous sexuality to both sexes.. Both men and women are conceived as merely capable of response to a situation..(and) regarded as helpless in the face of seduction.

While Davenport (1965) reports that in South West Pacific society, intercourse is assumed to be equally pleasureable for both sexes (and deprivation equally harmful). Malinowski (1932) notes the Kwoma and Mataco societies where women exclusively take the sexual initiative.

The frequency of sexual intercourse is also culture-based. In Western societies, with the "consumerisation of sex":

a great deal of energy (is spent) trying either to express, or in some cases, suppress sexuality. Sexuality in a direct or veiled form pervades our literature, painting and music. Sexuality is also an important part of our everyday conversation, ranging from sexual jokes to serious discussions of sex and morality (Maier 1984).

Heider (1976) studied the Dani society in south-east Asia who rarely have intercourse (nor masturbate), and show few signs of concern or frustration.

"NORMALITY"

Sexuality is a key issue for feminists, and Jackson and Scott (1996) do not find this surprising:

Historically enormous efforts, from chastity belts to property laws, have been made to control female sexuality and to tie women to individual men through monogamous heterosexual relations. The double standard of morality has entitled men to sexual freedoms denied to women. It has also divided women themselves into two categories: the respectable madonna and the rebarbative whore. Women's sexuality has been policed and regulated in a way which men's has not: it is the women prostitute who is stigmatised and punished, not her male clients (p3).

Willis (1977) describes how young working class men pursued women for sex (sometimes roughly), and then dropped them and labelled them as "loose" when they gave in.

Contained within the Jackson and Scott quote are the main themes that emerge from any analysis of gender and sexuality: double standards between what is permissible for men and women; the control or denying of female sexuality, while the existence of contradictory messages - virgin/whore.

For Dworkin (1979), the key is that men have the

"power of naming"; ie: the ability to define reality:

If she wants him sexually he names her slut;
if she does not want he rapes and says she does (p18).

Some writers would also highlight the compulsory monogamous heterosexuality that is assumed.

Many feminists see Sigmund Freud as the originator of the negative attitude to women's sexuality. The radical feminist, Anne Koedt (1972) sees Freud as believing the lack of a penis made women inferior.

In terms of assessing the historical construction of sexuality, Foucault (1979) takes a different view to many traditional histories. For many, the Victorian period was one of silence about sexuality, but, for Foucault, it was the opposite. It was a period of cataloguing and categorising of individual acts, and the establishing of sexualities as part of the person rather than specific acts. For example, a person is a homosexual rather than performing homosexual acts.

Kitzinger (1994) points out that:

homosexual activity is translated into homosexual (or lesbian, gay etc) identity. Heterosexual activity per se is generally seen as having no particular implications for identity (p195).

Most importantly, "normal" and "abnormal" sexuality were clearly laid out. Jeffreys (1985) quotes the example of passionate middle class female friendships in the 18th and 19th centuries, which were accepted at that time as "useful because they trained women in the ways of love in preparation for marriage". In the late 19th century with the construction of the category "lesbian", these friendships became seen as unacceptable.

Another example of the definition of normal and abnormal sexuality comes from the psychiatric categories for mental illness. DSM II (1968) included homosexuality as a sexual deviation⁴. This was removed in 1973, and replaced by the category "ego-dystonic homosexuality" (EDH) - someone who finds their homosexuality anxiety-producing and prefers to be heterosexual. DSM IIIR (1987) dropped EDH, while the current term is "sexual disorder not otherwise specified" (DSM IV 1994). This is a category for "persistent and marked distress about one's sexual orientation".

⁴ DSM stands for the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders. It is used by psychiatrists to classify and diagnose mental illness.

While in East Bay, Melanesia, male homosexuality is positively encouraged during adolescence (Humphreys 1997).

LESBIANISM

Despite media which often seem saturated with sexual imagery, sex as a serious topic of conversation is still taboo in many contexts. This is exacerbated by powerful discourses which construct only certain expressions of sexual desire and behaviour as normal and acceptable (Marsh 1996 p309).

This is usually heterosexuality, and particularly focused on intercourse.

Modern culture has assumed an intimate connection between the fact of being biologically male or female.. and the correct form of erotic behaviour (usually genital intercourse between men and women) (Weeks 1986 p13).

Richardson (1992) ironically points out that many sexually active lesbians are technically virgin because they have never had penetrative intercourse.

Within feminist writings, the issue of lesbianism has figured more and more. Often as much as a political statement as a sexual preference.

For a woman to be a lesbian in a male-supremacist, capitalist, misogynist, racist, homophobic, imperialist culture, such as that of North America, is an act of resistance.. No matter how a woman lives out her lesbianism - in the closet, in the state legislature, in the bedroom - she has rebelled against becoming the slave master's concubine, viz. the male-dependent female, the female heterosexual. This rebellion is dangerous business in patriarchy (Clarke 1981).

While Wittig (1992) takes the argument further: "'woman' has meaning only in heterosexual systems of thought and heterosexual economic systems. Lesbians are not women".

COERCIVE SEX

Part of the control of female sexuality can be seen in the use of sexual violence and coercive sex. Kelly (1988) sees a continuum of sexual violence from sexism, to mild pressure to have unwanted sex, to overtly coerced sex, to child abuse, and to rape. While Bart (1983)

prefers a continuum from consensual sex, to altruistic sex (feeling sorry for the man or guilty about saying no), to compliant sex (where the consequences of not doing it are worse than doing it), to rape.

Within dominant cultural discourses, men are cast as the active initiators of sexual activity and women as passive recipients of male advances; men's desires are seen as uncontrollable urges which women are paradoxically expected both to satisfy and to restrain (Jackson and Scott 1996 pp17-18).

The discourse of "uncontrollable urges" is key in our society.

Gavey (1992) highlights the cultural supports for coercion:

- i) the inevitability of penetration;
- ii) the absence of female discourses in heterosexual acts;
- iii) no meaning in consent or restraint by women as "no" means "yes", what does "yes" mean?
- iv) the fear of abnormality eg being seen as "frigid";
- v) female socialisation of self-sacrifice.

The normality of coercion is summed up by the attitudes of sexologists that it would be ludicrous to define a "man who kisses a girl in defiance of her expressed wishes" as a sexual offence (Gebhard et al 1965).

Hollway (1984) highlights how the "male sexual drive discourse" has support from scientific and biological theories as to "ensure reproduction of the species". But this discourse also influences women - attracting and keeping a man by continuing to be attractive to him.

Within evolutionary psychology (EP), which has growing support today, all human behaviour focuses on passing the genes into the next generation. Men and women are searching for good genes to mate with, and advertising their fertility.

Singh (1993) argues that in women good genes and fertility can be seen in the waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) (waist circumference divided by the hip circumference). The ideal WHR is around 0.7. Singh finds support for this ideal in the statistics of "Miss America" winners and "Playboy" centrefolds. Put another way, men want these women because from an evolutionary viewpoint, there

are the most fertile. Cartwright (1996) summarises the argument:

human beings are a sexually selected species and that many of our traits.. are features designed to make us appear more attractive to members of the opposite sex (p12).

For example, Thornhill (2000) produced an evolutionary explanation for rape as an "alternative mating strategy", which is a "natural, biological phenomenon and a product of our evolutionary heritage". Thornhill is quick to emphasise that he does not condone rape.

He points out that most rape victims are young women of child-bearing age, and this suggests a "reproductive benefit" to the behaviour. Statistically, though, many rapes are committed on individuals not of child-bearing age (ie children and older women) (Ochert 2000).

The main basis of Thornhill's work is studies with other species, like the scorpion fly. Male scorpion flies have a kind of clamp ("a specialised rape organ") that immobilises the female for forced mating. Overall Palmer and Thornhill (2000) argue that rape is an act of sex, not violence.

While the anthropologist, James Brain (1979), points out that women's bodies:

can be seen to be signalling their readiness for sex at any time (compared to other species)..(women) should realise the powerful effect that their clothes have in stimulating male sexual interests.

Also within the discourse of "male sex drive" is the "eroticising of powerlessness" (Kitzinger 1994) ie the attractiveness of the dominant male who sweeps the woman off her feet etc.

Gavey (1992) interviewed women about their sex lives, and in particular coerced experiences of intercourse. One interviewee reports being accused of not caring if she did not have sex when her partner wanted, and a consequent argument developing. While another interviewee admits giving in to his demands for sex, just for "a few hours rest and peace and quiet".

While Gavey (1996) admits:

several women reported experiences which seemed to me like clear cases of rape or sexual aggression, but which they were reluctant to label as such - thus implicitly accepting them to be within the realm of ordinary heterosexual practice.

Rich (1980) argues that heterosexuality is thus enforced as the "normal" sexual preference of women. While Dworkin (1987) highlights a wider issue:

we are poorer than men in money and so we have to barter sex or sell it outright (which is why they keep us poorer in money)..we need their need; intercourse is frequently how we get" (p150).

The structure of the sexual encounter makes it difficult for women to encourage the use of condoms by their sexual partners. Holland et al (1990) interviewed a number of young women and found a selection of strategies used.

We found embarrassment about every stage of condom use. When young women put their reputations first, then buying condoms, carrying them, and of course, asking for their use are all embarrassing. Having a condom on one's person indicates a lack of sexual innocence, an unfeminine identity, that of a woman actively seeking sex. The sexual woman, is then, easy, fair game, a slag and generally at men's disposal.

Feminists have viewed sexual coercion and violence as the enactment of male power and the manifestation of patriarchy. Brownmiller (1976) points out that rape is "nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear".

While for many men, rape is a form of seduction which uses force. Because of the "uncontrollable urges", prostitution is seen as providing a "necessary service". Men's "sexual needs" must be met in some way, and it is better to "make use" of a "willing participant" (prostitute) than an unwilling one. "The whore can only figure in male imagination under patriarchal domination, within which women are reduced to their sex" (Jackson and Scott 1996 p21).

Kanin (1985 quoted in Sabini 1995) interviewed around 300 male American undergraduates, of which one-third had admitted to "date rape". The research compared the attitudes of the rapists and the non-rapists, and found little difference in their attitudes, only the matter of degree.

Both groups admitted attempting to intoxicate the partner with alcohol or falsely professing love in order to manipulate the woman to have sexual intercourse on the date. The 'date rape' was not perceived as an offence when there was a history

of intercourse between the couple, or when the man had paid for an expensive outing, or when the woman had agreed to go to the man's house after the date. The same was true if the women asked the man out, or when she waited until late in the sexual encounter to protest (for example, when they were kissing) (Brewer 2000 p34).

Disturbingly, this view follows in the traditional again of sexologists:

..the difference between a 'good time' and a 'rape' may hinge on whether the girl's parents were awake when she finally arrived home (Gebhard et al 1965 p178).

In a similar vein, a study by the Edinburgh-based Zero Tolerance Charitable Trust (which campaigns against sexual and physical violence against women) found that one in two men think rape is acceptable in certain situations. The acceptable situations included if the woman was a wife, or "if she'd slept with loads of men".

The study interviewed over 2000 people aged 14-21 years. One in four men (and one in eight women) thought hitting a woman acceptable "if she'd slept with someone else" (Brewer 2000).

Sexologists Gebhard et al (1965) again:

Our society expects the male to be the aggressor in heterosexual relationships, and a certain amount of physical force and duress is consequently acceptable and perhaps even socially necessary (p108).

In a series of experiments, Jones and Aronson (1973) varied the scenarios around a rape; from a victim who was a virgin, or was provocatively dressed, or was divorced. The latter scenarios were not perceived as so bad by the participants reading the stories.

While Bohner et al (1998) found a strong correlation among 125 male students between rape myth acceptance (RMA) (ie: the victim is to blame) and the proclivity to rape (RP). This latter behaviour was measured using the "Attraction Toward Sexual Aggression" Scale, which includes items like "many women really want to be raped".

The common misconception, argue Abbott and Wallace (1997) is that "rape must be pleasureable for women because it involves penetration" (p250).

Canter and Heritage (1990) analysed the victim statements from 66 UK sexual assaults, and found three ways in which the victim is treated:

- i) victim as person - this involves conversation during the attack, even asking whether the woman has a boyfriend. The attacker mistakenly believes they are forming a relationship;
- ii) victim as object - this involves blindfolding and/or gagging. The offender is concerned with control;
- iii) victim as vehicle - violence is used to demean the victim, and is a reflection of the offender's anger.

These results are concerned with the more severe sexual assaults. But even the apparently "harmless" situation of indecent exposure "is likely to reinforce those fear (of sexual crime) rather than to exacerbate them. It is not in any sense a trivial offence" (Riordan 1999 p315).

Riordan (1999) distributed 72 questionnaires to women in the East Midlands asking them about their experiences of indecent exposure. Thirty-five respondents had been victims. 80% of those were concerned about what would follow the exposure, and ten victims had subsequently changed their behaviours in some way since.

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WHO IS RESPONSIBLE? - REPORTING OF DEATH OF MAN WITH PERSONALITY DISORDER

INTRODUCTION

It is fairly clear that the media portrayal of mental health issues is far from positive. The enriching of tabloid headlines with phrases like "loony left" helps to create and perpetuate the link between mental illness and dangerousness. Then there is the overemphasis on stories which contain those links.

Greg Fallow (1995), of the Glasgow University Media Group, notes how the term "mental illness" has become associated with violence or killer, especially the terms "schizophrenia" and "personality disorder".

Yarney (1999), in an extensive UK survey, found that over 70% of the respondents linked "dangerousness" and "unpredictability" with schizophrenia. What violence there is related to mental illness accounts for a "minute proportion of society's violence" (Taylor and Monahan 1996).

A Glasgow University Media Group study of television, newspapers, and magazines during one month in 1993 found 422 references to "harm" (either self or others) out of 534 (quoted in Atkinson 1996).

More recently, Wilson et al (2000) sampled one week of children's television for under 10s in New Zealand. They found that 46.1% of the references to mental illness were negative and stigmatising, using terms like "crazy", "loony", or "wacko". The authors note how "Young viewers are being socialised into the stigmatising conceptions of mental illness" (p440).

Not only does this create the general myth, but it becomes part of the self of individuals labelled with these terms ie the negative image and stigmatization.

What is disturbing is the normality of the association between mental illness and violence.

FINDINGS

A content analysis of eight issues of a local newspaper ⁵ in 2002 ⁶ found one article only related to mental health issues ⁷. This is the report of a man who

⁵ Local newspaper with a distribution of 58 000, partly free and partly sold. Average of 130 pages in total, mostly advertisements, and only about 30 pages of news, which were used in this analysis.

⁶ Number 6043 to 6049, and 6051 (19th July to 30th August, and 13th September 2002); appears weekly on Fridays.

⁷ Approximate length 700 words with accompanying photograph of the local tower block. There is no

died after falling from the ninth floor of a tower block, and is entitled "Warnings, but man is put in high-rise" ⁸.

The emphasis of the story is upon the "obvious" indicators that the man ("suffering from a personality disorder"; lines 39-40) was intending to kill himself after release from hospital. The authorities are accused of being oblivious to these "obvious" signs (even incompetent), and giving him council housing high (ninth floor) in a tower block. The coroner recorded an open verdict.

Table 1 lists the "obvious" signs of danger, and examples of how the officials "ignored" them.

"OBVIOUS" WARNING SIGNS

- "...housed.. on 9th floor of a tower - despite being warned he could jump.." (lines 2-5)
- "...even though his consultant psychiatrist feared he would attempt suicide.." (lines 10-12)
- "...after being involved in previous incidents.." (lines 17-18)
- "...despite his consultant psychiatrist sending two faxes to ..housing department.." (lines 45-49)
- "A note written by.. was found by police at his home following the incident.." (lines 58-61)
- "...cocktail of drink and drugs in his blood.." (lines 63-65)
- "...would drink to relieve pains in his head.." (lines 74-75)
- "...comments he had made in the past about not wanting to be here.." (lines 80-83)
- warnings "omitted from relevant housing forms through lack of room.." (lines 52-54)

OFFICIALS OBLIVIOUS

- "...coroner.. said she was not convinced 'beyond reasonable doubt' that.. intended to kill himself.." (lines 22-27)
- "...there was no indication ..was considered at risk of committing suicide.." (official of council) (lines 104-106)

writer's name given. Thus assumed to be written by staff of newspaper group.

⁸ p15 of 19th July issue. It is reported from the coroner's court, and a subsequent press release by the local council.

Table 1 - Examples of themes from the newspaper article.

Janice Hartley (2002) pointed out a report on a suicide at a Devon beauty spot, and how the individuals were not treated as real people: "a non-person, an unperson, or something-less-than-a-person". Thus with this article, there were no references to the individual as a person, other than brief factual information.

The only quotes from the mother were to emphasise the predictability of the man's death. The death is a vehicle by which to criticise the local council for ignoring the warnings of the experts (eg: consultant psychiatrist)⁹. All we know about the man's personal life is a single man, 30 years old, painter and decorator, and had "pains in his head" that led him to drink, as well as his name.

The reference to the diagnosis of personality disorder tells us enough about him. He had "mental problems" which "may have unpredictable consequences" (forensic scientist; lines 69-71). It is almost as if such a person will inevitably kill themselves. Note the contradictory discourses¹⁰ - the predictability of the suicide against the unpredictability of mentally ill people.

Yet the coroner gave an open verdict, and did not accept suicide. Is this the coroner ignoring the "obvious" signs, or that there was not enough evidence: "he fell from his window" (line 16)? The newspaper knows the answer to be the first. Once more officials have failed us ("ordinary people"), and indirectly, "Care in the Community" has failed again.

Rose (1997) notes how since the Christopher Clunis case (December 1993), it is now assumed in reports that "Care in the Community" (or its failure) is linked to violence. "These people" are a risk to (us)/ themselves, and should be kept in a controlled environment for their own (our) safety. The local Mental Health Trust is "being asked to look at its procedures so 'a similar tragedy is not repeated'.." (lines 122-124).

Hartley (2002) takes the argument further:

If you are a mental patient then somebody has to be held responsible if things go wrong. This is because you are not a real person. Real people are responsible for themselves when things go wrong. Mental patients are not, and so somebody

⁹ Three experts are directly quoted (consultant psychiatrist, forensic scientist, and coroner) compared to one non-expert (mother), who backs up the expert view. David Crepez Keay (1995) notes how the authorities are reported so much more often than the clients or patients themselves.

¹⁰ Brewer (2001a + b) notes the role of contradictory discourses in eating disorders, and in the construction of the self generally.

else has to be held accountable (p15).

There are interesting discourses in this quote which show the images of "normality" and "abnormality". For example, "responsibility", and the attempt of "normal" people to pass this on in times of trouble. Maybe blaming someone else is not just for the "non-persons"; finding somebody else to be accountable happens for all. All of this exists in the context of individuals believing that they control their lives and are responsible for it because they are "normal".

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